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HOLIDAY ACRES v. MIDWEST FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION: PREEMPTION OF
THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE
Due-on-sale clauses,' in mortgages and other security agreements, 2
grant lenders the option to declare an entire loan balance due and
payable immediately upon transfer of the collateral property Tra-
ditionally, lenders utilized these clauses to protect their security from
impairment4 when title to the property passed to persons other than
I. Due-on-sale clauses began to appear routinely in mortgages and deeds of trust
in the 1960's. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing
in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6
U.S.F. L. REv. 267, 271 (1972). See Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on
Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747 (1973).
Due-on-sale clauses appear in myriad forms. See note 15 infra for a fairly typical
example. See Bonanno, supra, at 272, nn.14-16 for other examples.
2. Acceleration clauses, which are substantially similar to due-on-sale clauses,
have appeared for many years in land sale contracts. See Volkmer, supra note 1 at
753-67. For chattel loans, the Uniform Commercial Code automatically grants lend-
ers rights similar to those granted lenders by due-on-sale clauses in mortgages. See,
e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-306, 9-505.
3. See generally Bonanno, supra note 1; Volkmer, supra note 1. A typical prop-
erty transfer that triggers exercise of the clause is the sale of real property wherein the
buyer assumes the seller's mortgage. See, e.g., cases cited note 8, infra. This type of
sale is becoming increasingly prevalent, though damaging to savings and loan as-
sociations, because it permits the buyer to assume the seller's mortgage, usually hav-
ing an interest rate much lower than current market mortgage interest rates. See Ban
on Due-on-Sale Clauses Would Psh Up Mortgage Rates, Says HUD Study, 8 Hous.
& DEv. REP. (BNA) 1055 (1981). See also note 9, infra. Another type of transfer that
triggers the clause is the sale of property with a wraparound mortgage. See Williams
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Arlington, 500 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Va. 1980), aft'd,
651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981) (land contract "wraparound" mortgage will trigger the
due-on-sale clause); Bartke & Tagaropulos, Michigan'r Looking Glass World of Due-
on-Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 971, 982-84 (1978).
Other types of mortgage and deeds of trust transfers that may trigger exercise of the
clause are junior encumbrances on the security (such as a "second mortgage" clause),
execution of leases with option to buy, installment land contract sales, and possibly
devises, as well as outright sales. Bonanno, supra note 1 at 727 n.14. See Annot., 69
A.L.R. 3d 713 (1976).
4. A lender may perceive a risk that the transferee will waste the property and
thus cause dimunition of the collateral's value. Alternatively, the transferee may
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the original borrower.5 With the onset of long-range inflation and
rising interest rates,' however, mortgage lenders have sought to use
due-on-sale clauses as leverage to negotiate a higher interest rate.7
State courts are split on the issue of whether use of the clause for this
purpose is permissible.8 Recently, federally chartered savings and
loan associations have attempted to circumvent state restrictions on
present a greater credit risk than the transferor. In both of these circumstances courts
have held that exercise of the clause is justified. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n,
276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578-79, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (1969). See, e.g., cases cited in
note 8, infra.
5. Bonanno,supra note 1, at 271; Comment, Due-on Clauses: Restraints on liena-
tion and the Legitimacy of Portfolio Maintenance, 14 WILLAMETrE L.J. 295, 296
(1978). See Volkmer, supra note 1, at 257-65 for a comprehensive discussion of the
traditional purpose of due-on-sale clauses.
6. See Bartke, supra note 3, at 973-84 for an excellent discussion of recent eco-
nomic developments that have influenced the use of due-on-sale clauses.
7. See generally Bartke, supra note 3. A lender may use a due-on-sale clause to
negotiate a higher interest rate by threatening to exercise the clause unless the buyer
agrees to pay a higher interest rate on the mortgage. Volkmer, supra, note 1 at 769.
See, e.g., cases cited in note 8, infra.
8. Jurisdictions that allow exercise of the clause only if there is a risk that security
will be impaired are as follows: Arizona: Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118
Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978). Arkansas: Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); California: Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,
21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Florida: First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Illinois: Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, .61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975);
Michigan: Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250
N.W.2d 804 (1977); Mississippi: Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975);
Oklahoma: Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla.
1977); Ohio: People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus. Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257
N.E.2d 406 (1970).
Jurisdictions that uphold use of the clauses to maintain lenders' loan portfolios at
current interest rates as well as to protect lender's security are: Alabama: Tierce v.
APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Colorado: Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294; 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Nebraska: Occidental Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980); Nevada: First Commercial
Title Inc. v. Holms, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); New Jersey: Fidelity Land
Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons, 151 N.J. Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977); Shalit v.
Investors Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (1968); New York:
Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978); North Carolina: Crock-
ett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Tennessee:
Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Utah: Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971); Washington: Terry v. Born, 24 Wash.
App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979); Wisconsin: Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Wis-
consin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
For a more comprehensive list, see Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 206
Neb. 469, 482, 293 N.W.2d 843, 850 (1980) (Appendix to Majority Opinion).
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their use of the clauses9 by claiming federal preemption.' ° Federal
9. See note 8 supra. Restrictions on the clause are attributable to diverging views
on a policy issue. This issue is whether sellers or lenders will bear the burden of
inflationary interest increases in the money market. In times of high interest rates,
mortgage assumptions are the preferred method of structuring home sales. See Note,
Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Casefor Adopting Standards of
Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1113 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Judicial Treatment]; Bartke, supra note 3 at 981. A homeowner with a low
interest mortgage can exact a premium sales price for his property. Property with an
assumable low interest loan will ultimately cost the buyer less than property mort-
gaged at prevailing rates. Therefore the buyer is willing and able to pay a premium
for the low interest property. See Bartke, supra note 3, at 981. But the premium price
is not necessarily a windfall to the seller (at least to the extent it represents inflation-
ary interest increases). In order to buy another home he must either obtain a mort-
gage at prevailing rates, using up the "windfall" he received, or he must pay a similar
premium to assume another mortgage.
The due-on-sale clause can work to shift the transaction's premium from the seller
to the lender. The lender may use the clause as leverage to negotiate a higher interest
rate. This will force the seller to lower his price to induce the buyer to assume the
mortgage at a higher interest rate. Judicial Treatment, supra, at 1113. Alternatively,
the lender may refuse to allow the assumption and call in the low-interest loan, thus
freeing his funds for re-lending at prevailing interest rates. Occidental Say. & Loan
Ass'n. v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 479, 293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1980).
In times of rising interest rates, if the seller or the lender realizes a premium from
the transaction, the other bears the cost of the rising rates. For a homeowner seeking
to sell his property, the effect of a due-on-sale clause exercised to raise interest rates
may amount to a restraint on alienation. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d
943, 950-51, 582 P.2d 970, 974-75 (1978), 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383-84. In times of tight
mortgage money or high interest rates, a homeowner can often sell only if the buyer
can assume the seller's mortgage. Id One reason is that as interest rates climb faster
than incomes, fewer buyers can qualify for high interest loans. See McDonough,
Advantages of Innovations in Variable-Rate Mortgages, in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND MARKETS IN A CHANGING WORLD 524 (Fraser & Rose eds. 1980). If the lender
chooses to call in the loan rather than allow the buyer to assume it, the effect is to
prohibit the sale. The buyer cannot borrow the funds to pay the loan and the seller
will not have the funds to pay it until the sale goes through. 21 Cal. 3d at 950-51, 582
P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84. On the other hand, if the lender waives his
right to exercise the clause in exchange for the buyer's assumption at a higher interest
rate, the seller usually has only two alternatives. He must either lower his price, thus
reducing his equity interest in the property and his ability to purchase a comparable
home, or he must terminate the sale. Id See also, Bonanno, supra note 1, at 284;
Judicial Treatment, supra at 1113. The consequences of such a situation can be partic-
ularly onerous for homeowners who must sell as a matter of necessity (because of job
transfers, etc.). See Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 642-43,
224 S.E.2d 580, 594-95 (1976) (dissenting opinion). Thus, if a lender uses the clause to
raise the interest rate, the seller's interests are damaged.
Alternatively, if the lender is prohibited from using the clause to negotiate a higher
rate, the lender rather than the seller is damaged. Mortgage lenders are predomi-
nantly savings and loan associations. C. HENNING, W. PIGOTT & R. SCOTT, FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY 143 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as HENNING].
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The associations are hit especially hard by the effects of inflationary interest increases
because of the nature of their assets. Id at 182. The associations "borrow short and
lend long." Over four-fifths of their assets are fixed-rate, long-term mortgages. Id at
148. Their liabilities, on the other hand, are primarily short-term deposits, removable
at will by the depositors. McDonough, supra at 524. In times of rising interest rates,
the associations must pay out higher rates to their depositors to attract funds for mort-
gage lending. Their mortgage portfolios, however, bring in income in the form of
interest, at less than the market rate. Id Thus the associations' cost of funds rises
faster than their mortgage portfolio yields, causing reduced or negative earnings. See
Advisory Opinion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Resolution No. 75-647,
Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Case No. Civ-75-366 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Schott Opinion]; Opinion of the Office of Economic Research On
the Revocation of the "Due-on-Sale Clause" in the State of California 3-5 [hereinafter
cited as OER]; S & L Cost of Funds Exceeds Mortgage Yield; Industry Suffers Heavy
Losses, 9 Hous. DEv. REP. (BNA) 397-98 (1981).
The effect of rapidly rising interest rates on the associations' earnings, combined
with federal regulation placing ceilings on the amount of interest the associations may
pay on deposits, have threatened the health of the savings and loan industry. See
HENNING, supra at 182; The Savings Revolution, TIME, June 8, 1981, at 58, 58-60
[hereinafter cited as TIME]. When interest rates began to rise above the ceilings, de-
positors began shifting their funds to higher yield investments on a massive scale. See
HENNING, supra at 182. From 1970 to 1980, deposits in the associations dropped
more than 26%. Time, supra at 62. As a result, the associations had even less money
to lend at prevailing rates to generate income and their earnings were reduced even
further. As of June, 1981 it was estimated that 90% of the nation's savings and loan
associations were losing money. Id at 58. Even though the government is currently
lifting the regulatory ceilings, one industry analyst estimated that if interest rates do
not abate, as many as one-third of the associations might fail in the next five years.
id
Thus savings and loan associations have a compelling reason for utilizing the
clause to raise their loan portfolio yield. Due-on-sale clauses are the associations'
main vehicle for raising mortgage yields as interest rates rise. Schott Opinion, sgra
at 22; Volkmer, supra note 1, at 769-70. As interest rates rise, more assumptions oc-
cur. See FNMA Delaying Enforcement ofDue-on-Sale Clause, 8 Hous. & DEv. REP.
(BNA) 359 (1980). A recent HUD study estimates that mortgage earnings losses
would equal a seven per cent capital loss if prohibitions on the enforcement of due-
on-sale clauses extended the existing loans' remaining life from 5 years to 15 years.
Ban on Due-On-Sale Clauses Would Push Up Mortgage Rates, Says HUD Study, 8
Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 1055 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HUD Study]. Such a loss
could severely damage the already unsteady savings and loan industry. Thus the as-
sociations are in no better position than sellers to bear the inflationary increase effects
in the money market.
Homebuyers may also suffer if exercise of the clause is prohibited. HUD Study,
supra at 1055; OER, supra at 3-5. Savings and loan associations, faced with shrinking
or negative spreads between interest they receive from their mortgage portfolios and
their cost of funds, will raise the mortgage rates on new loans to create more income.
OER, supra at 3-5. See Comment, Due-On Clauses: Restraints on Alienation and the
Legitimacy ofPortfolio Maintenance, 14 WILLAMETrE L.J. 295, 309 (1978), for a dis-
cussion of this effect. As a result, prospective homeowners may be forced to down-
grade their purchases or forego home ownership altogether. McDonough, supra at
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courts have upheld the federal associations' arguments."' A recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision brings the controversy into sharp
focus. Holiday Acres v. Midwest Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion 12 held that federal law does not preempt state law with respect to
exercise of due-on-sale clauses by a federal savings and loan
association. "
In Holiday Acres, Midwest Federal Savings and Loan (Midwest)
financed the purchase of an apartment complex by Holiday Acres
(Holiday).' 4 The mortgage contained a standard due-on-sale
clause.' 5 Holiday attempted to sell the property by transfering the
mortgage to a third party buyer.' 6 Midwest threatened to exercise the
clause unless the buyer agreed to refinance the property at a higher
524. Since the due-on-sale clause is a major vehicle for raising portfolio yields, prohi-
bition of the clause exacerbates high mortgage rates to the home buyer's detriment.
HUD Study, supra at 1055; OER, supra at 6.
Thus the decision of whether or not to permit the savings and loan associations' use
of the clause to raise mortgage interest rates is a complex one. Either alternative
could have a substantial adverse impact on sellers and on lenders.
10. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D.
Fla. 1981); Bailey v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. M11. 979);
De la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr.
467 (1981), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4916 (June 28, 1982) (No. 81-750).
Specifically, the federal associations allege that Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) regulations, which permit federal association use of the clause to raise inter-
est rates, (see note 70 infra) preempt state laws governing the federal associations'
activities in this area.
11. Cases in which federal courts have ruled that FHLBB regulations preempt
state law with respect to the federal associations' exercise of the clause include: First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 737 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Williams
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 307, 308 (E.D. Va. 1980); Conference of
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
12. 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
13. Id at 480.
14. Id at 473. Holiday is a partnership formed for investment purposes. Midwest
is a federally chartered savings and loan association. Id
15. Id at 474. Midwest's due-on-sale clause provided as follows:
In the event that the mortgagors convey the title, (legal, equitable or both) to
all or any portion of said premises or in the event that such title becomes vested
in a person other than the mortgagors in any manner whatsoever except under
the power of eminent domain, that in any such case the entire unpaid principal of
the note secured hereby with all accrued interest thereon shall, at the option of
the mortgagee at any time thereafter, become immediately due and payable with-
out notice.
Id
16. Id
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interest rate." The buyer terminated the purchase agreement and
Holiday sought a declaratory judgment that Midwest's use of the
clause was an illegal restraint on alienation. 8 Midwest alleged that,
as a federally chartered savings and loan association, federal law ex-
clusively governed its exercise of the clause.19 The Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding no congressional in-
tent in the relevant federal statutes20 and regulations21 to preempt
state law.2
The doctrine of preemption, deriving from the supremacy clause, 23
allows Congress to preempt state law that conflicts with a valid exer-
cise of federal power.2 a Federal preemption may be explicit in the
17. Id In addition, Midwest would require that the loan be callable after ten
years. Id
18. Id at 473. On remand from a previous Minnesota Supreme Court ruling (see
Holiday Acres v. Midwest, 271 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1978)), the Dakota County Dis-
trict Court agreed with Holiday and permanently restrained Midwest from exercising
any rights under the clause. Id For a discussion of due-on-sale clauses as restraints
on alienation, see Bonanno, supra note 1, at 273-91; Volkmer, supra note 1, at 769-
804; Bartke, supra note 3, at 984-1009; Note, Due-on-Sale Clauses and Restraints on
Alienation: Does Wellenkamp Appl to Federal Institutions?, 11 PAC. L.J. 1085, 1085-
96 (1980); Comment, Due-On-Sale Clause Not a Restraint On Alienation of Property,
59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1047 (1981).
19. 308 N.W.2d at 474.
20. The relevant federal statutes include Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Ch. 522,
47 Stat. 725 (1932), codifiedat 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (1933), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470
(1976 & Supp. 1 1979).
21. The relevant federal regulations include 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (f) and (g), re-
codfied at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) and (g) (1980).
22. 308 N.W.2d at 479-80. The court found that federal law did not preempt state
regulation of due-on-sale clauses used by federal savings and loan associations. Nev-
ertheless, it overturned the lower court's decision in favor of Holiday. The Minnesota
Supreme Court found that, since Holiday was an investor in residential property
rather than a homeowner, the economic exigencies of the transaction did not amount
to an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id at 484. For further information on
due-on-sale clauses as restraints on alienation, see note 18 supra.
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
24. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (Federal Waterways
Safety Act preempts Washington statute regulating oil tankers); Jones v. Rath Pack-
ing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (federal statute preempts California law regarding pack-
age labeling for meat and flour); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411
U.S. 624 (1973) (FAA has full control over aircraft noise under Noise Control Act
and therefore preempts state control); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963) (state statutes regarding permissible percentage of oil in avocados
do not conflict with Federal laws certifying avocados as mature); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (Federal Warehouse Act preempts state licensing
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statute's language or implicit in a statutory purpose or design.25 In
finding an implicit intent to preempt, courts look for a federal interest
so strong as to require national uniformity,26 or a statutory scheme so
pervasive that it wholly occupies a field of legislation.27 If, as part of
a statutory scheme, Congress delegates authority to an agency to act
alone in a field, administrative regulations as well as statutes may
preempt state law.2" Even if Congress has not entirely foreclosed leg-
islation in a particular area, state law that conflicts with federal law is
void.29 Conflict may mean that compliance with both federal and
state law is physically impossible or that state law prevents realiza-
tion of a federal law's purpose.30
Congress, in the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA),31 dele-
gated the authority to create and regulate federal savings and loan
associations to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the Board).32
HOLA, which amended the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 19323
(the FHLBA), was part of a congressional plan to maintain the avail-
ability of funds for home mortgages and to control the national econ-
omy.34 Responding to the depression crisis in home financing,
of those warehouses licensed under the Act and of other matters regulated by the
Act).
25. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 157; Jones v. Rath Packing, 430
U.S. at 525; City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. at 633.
26. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 143-44.
27. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. at 157; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. at 230.
28. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961). See also, Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loans Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. 4916, 4919 (June 28, 1982) (No. 81-
750).
29. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 907 (C.D. Cal.
1978).
30. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
31. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470) (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) as amended by HOLA of
1933, ch. 64,48 Stats. 128 (1933), codKed at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
34. See Brief for Amicus Federal Home Loan Bank Board at 12, note 9, Holiday
Acres v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Amicus].
On April 13, 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a letter to Congress on the
objectives of S. 1317 and H.R. 4980, the legislation that subsequently became known
as HOLA. The letter stated in part: "Implicit in the legislation ... is a declaration of
1982]
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Congress purported to create a national system of financial in-
termediaries and to promote sound, uniform lending practices
through HOLA.35 Congress did not expressly articulate the extent to
national policy. This policy is that the broad interest of the Nation requires that
special safeguards should be thrown around home ownership as a guaranty of social
and economic stability." H.R. Doc. No. 19, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1618, 1702 (1933).
Id
35. See Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 908 n.9 (C.D.
Cal. 1978), citing FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK SYSTEM 17 (1971) and MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD
18-19 (1969).
The schemes of HOLA and the FHLBA reflect this congressional purpose. The
FHLBA created an independent federal agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(the Board) and directed it to set up twelve Home Loan Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1423
(1976). These banks were to facilitate the flow of funds to the mortgage market by
providing a secondary line of financial intermediation for member lending institu-
tions such as state mortgage lenders. Brief for Amicus, supra; 459 F. Supp. at 908.
But the FHLBA proved an ineffective remedy to the crisis in home financing. Al-
though general economic conditions were partially responsible for the crisis, the lend-
ing practices of state financial institutions contributed significantly to the problem.
These practices included the broad scale use of "sinking fund" loans. Under the
terms of these loans, principal payments first were accumulated in a compulsory
savings account until the balance, together with any dividends that had been
credited to the account, equalled the amount of the loan, at which time the loan
was paid off. Among the disadvantages of this plan were that the loan took
longer to mature than expected if dividend rates were reduced, share values
could be written down in case of reorganization, and entire share accounts could
be sacrificed in case of liquidation, including those required of borrowers. The
borrower, however, still owed the full amount of the mortgage.
STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY IN CALIFOR-
NIA, Section 111-37 (1960), quoted in Brief for Amicus, supra note 34, at 13; 459 F.
Supp. at 908. Financial institutions also frequently used loans that called for balloon
payments. This provided for the rollover of principal at specified intervals. Brief for
Amicus supra note 34, at 14.
One reason that the Bank Act failed to deal adequately with the emergency was
that it made no attempt to reform the existing state-run home-financing system. Id.
Therefore, a year after passage of the FHLBA, Congress refined the scheme by enact-
ing HOLA. As part of its plan to suppress the unsound practices of the local institu-
tions, and to replace them with uniform federal standards, HOLA provided for the
creation of federally chartered savings & loan associations which would be subject to
uniform regulation by the Board.
In creating that system, Congress could have elected to subject the operations of
federal associations to state law. Had Congress done so, however, it would have
perpetuated in the federal system precisely the pernicious state practices that the
HOLA was designed to eliminate. This would have been anathema to a Con-
gress so acutely cognizant of the failings of the existing state operated home-
financing system.
Id. at 15.
A second part of HOLA's scheme to suppress unsound local practices and replace
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which HOLA and the Board's regulations were to preclude concomi-
tant state control over the federal associations.3 6 The Act contem-
plates some state regulation; for instance, it provides that state laws
regarding discrimination, consumer protection and taxation apply to
the federal associations.37 Beyond HOLA's express delegation of cer-
tain matters to state control, the Act's language grants the Board ple-
nary power to regulate the federal associations.38
Although courts acknowledge the plenary nature of the Board's
regulation of federal associations,39 they disagree on whether
HOLA's scheme occupies the entire field.4" Courts uniformly find
them with uniform federal standards was the creation of the Home Owners Loan
Corporation. This agency was authorized to exchange its bonds for mortgages held
by various financial institutions, including savings and loan associations. Id The
only mortgages eligible for exchange were those that required direct monthly pay-
ments in equal installments. Loans that called for balloon payments and for repay-
ment by sinking fund were ineligible. Id.
36. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(l)(h)(l) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The statute states:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest
their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is au-
thorized, under such rules and regulations as it may perscribe, to provide for the
organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associa-
tions to be known as "Federal Savings and Loan Associations", and to issue
charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of local mu-
tual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States.
Id
39. See, e.g., Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Fields, 128 F.2d 705, 707
(8th Cir. 1942) (Board's regulations regarding branch offices are binding on a federal
association and have the force of law so therefore preempt state law); Federal Home
Loan Bank Board v. Superior Court of State of Arizona, 494 F. Supp. 924, 925 (D.
Ariz. 1980) (Board's regulation prohibiting disclosure of reports of examinations of
the federal associations had the force and effect of law); California v. Coast Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (Board's regulations regarding
advertising by federal associations have the force and effect of law and thereby pre-
empt state control); Woodward v. Broadway Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App.
2d 218, 244 P.2d 467 (1952) (Nominees for director of federal associations challenging
manner in which election was conducted must exhaust administrative remedies pro-
vided in the Board's regulations which have force and effect of law).
40. Compare Lyons v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 377 F. Supp. 11, 17
(N.D. Ill. 1974), California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 318-19
(S.D. Cal. 1951) holding HOLA's scheme occupies the entire field, with Murphy v.
Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 612 (2d Cir. 1967); Federal Say. &
Loan Insurance Corp. v. Kearney Trust, 151 F.2d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 1945); Rettig v.
Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823; (W.D. Pa. 1975);
City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 656 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
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express preemption of those federal association activities governed by
HOLA provisions4 and by Board regulations.42 In addition, courts
agree that, even in the absence of express provisions or regulations,
HOLA's scheme occupies the entire field of the federal associations
internal affairs and thus preempts state control of these affairs.
43
holding HOLA's scheme occupies the field of the federal association's internal
matters.
41. See, e.g., United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 481 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973)
(state statutes which allowed no tax deduction for loans made on real estate outside a
50 mile radius amount to a "greater tax on federal associations," prohibited by
HOLA; thus state statute preempted); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. of Altadena v.
Johnson, 49 Cal. App. 2d 465, 122 P.2d 84 (1942) (Federal saving and loan association
subject to state tax as long as the tax is not greater than that levied on similar state
institutions).
42. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st
Cir., 1979) (Board's regulations concerning escrow accounts preempt state law); Mey-
ers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974) (Board's
regulations concerning prepayment clauses preempt state law); North Arlington Na-
tional Bank v. Kearney, 187 F.2d 564, 565 (3rd Cir. 1951) (Board's regulations con-
cerning branch offices preempt state law); Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Balaban, 281 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973) (Board's regulations concerning branch offices
preempt state law).
43. Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823
(W.D. Pa. 1975).
By virtue of the plenary powers vested in the Board by the HOLA, the courts
have consistently recognized the congressional intent to have federal law govern
the regulation and supervision of federal associations. [Citations omitted.] The
cases are legion which hold that this preemptive delegation of authority to the
Board extends to the internal operation of these institutions, precluding any reg-
ulation or interference by the state [Citations omitted] . . . mo the extent that
there may be gaps in the Board's consideration of these matters it is necessary for
the courts to fashion and apply federal common law.
Id at 823, 824; see also Comment, The Due-on Clause: 4 Preemption Controversy, 10
LOYOLA L.A. L. REv., 629, 635-36 (1977).
For example, courts hold that fiduciary duties, see, e.g., Fed. Say. & Loan Insur-
ance Corp. v. Third National Bank of Nashville, 153 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1945); Rettig
v. Arlington Heights Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Pa. 1975); City Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1975); rights of sharehold-
ers, see, e.g., Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967);
Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 371 F.
Supp. 306 (C.D. Cal. 1973); and advertising practices, see, e.g., People of State of
California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951) are
internal affairs and are thereby preempted, despite the absence of federal regulation.
By comparison, courts look to express regulations to decide issues of interest paid on
escrow accounts, see, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Boston v. Greenwald, 591
F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979), and branch offices, see, e.g., North Arlington National Bank
v. Kearney, 187 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1951); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Balaban, 281 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973). These decisions imply that the scope of federal
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Does federal preemption extend to due-on-sale clauses included in
the associations' mortgage contracts? Neither HOLA nor the
FHLBA expressly mention due-on-sale clauses. The Board, on the
other hand, has consistently maintained that federal law exclusively
governs the federal associations' use of the clause.44 In Schott v. Mis-
sion Federal Savings and Loan Association, plaintiffs attacked the
due-on-sale clause in the federal association's mortgage. At the re-
quest of the Schott court, the Board filed a formal advisory opinion'
preemption extends to matters expressly preempted by statutes and regulations, and
to the associations' internal matters implicitly preempted by HOLA's scheme. Under
this view, state control extends to the federal associations' "external" affairs not gov-
erned by regulations, as well as matters expressly delegated to state control by HOLA.
See Comment, The Due-On Clause: A Preemption Controversy, supra at 636.
Two courts have used this framework to determine if state law controls clauses in
the federal associations' mortgage contracts. These courts have held that federal law
preempts clauses closely analogous to due-on-sale clauses. In Kaski v. First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n of Madison, 72 Wis.2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that an interest rate escalation clause in a federal association's
mortgage contract was an internal matter. The clause read as follows:
The rate of interest stipulated herein may be increased at the option of the Asso-
ciation; provided, however, that the Association may not exercise such right in
less than three years from the date of the loan, and then only upon at least four
months' written notice to the borrower. ....
Id at 133 n.l, 240 N.W.2d at 369 n.l. The court also noted:
The general tenor of these cases is that any regulatory power which a state at-
tempts to exercise that potentially conflicts with federal legislation or its purpose,
or that results in lack of uniformity in the internal management or lending prac-
tices of federal savings and loan associations, is subordinate to federal law. The
regulation of loan practices directly affects the internal management and opera-
tions of federal associations and therefore requires uniform federal control.
Id at 141-42, 240 N.W.2d at 373.
Despite the absence of a regulation on point, the court held that the Board's regula-
tion of federal associations' lending practices demonstrated a congressional intent to
occupy the field. Id at 140; 240 N.W.2d at 372.
In the second case, Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145
(9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit considered a federal regulation directly on point as
evidence of federal preemption in the area of prepayment clauses in the association's
mortgage contracts.
44. Schott Opinion, supra note 9, at 14-15 & n.4.
45. Case No. Civ 75-366 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
46. Id at 38.
The Board described the legal weight courts should accord its advisory opinions as
follows:
Where a Board regulation, such as 12 C.F.R. 545.6-11, grants a right or im-
poses a duty in "general" terms respecting Federal associations or their members,
any issue concerning such rights or duties must be resolved exclusively under
Federal law. . . . Therefore, to the extent that there may be gaps in the general
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on the preemption question.47 The opinion asserted that even in the
absence of express regulations, HOLA's delegation of plenary au-
thority to the Board implied congressional intent to preempt state
control of the federal associations' internal affairs.48  Furthermore,
subject matter encompassed by the Board's regulations, they must be "fleshed
out" by Federal law in one of two ways. The Board may close the "gap" by the
promulgation of additional regulations, the adoption of Board Rulings or Policy
Statements, or by the issuance of interpretive opinions, such as this Advisory
Opinion. Alternatively, to the extent that the Board does not take such specific
formal action, it will be necessary for the courts to resolve the matter by applying
or fashioning Federal common law.
When "fashioning" Federal common law, the Court should give considerable
weight to the Board's interpretation of its own regulations. See, e.g., Bowles v.
Seminold Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,413-414; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1965).
Id. at 15.
Udall v. Tallman holds that courts should give great weight to an administrative
agency's interpretation of its regulation unless the interpretation is inconsistent with
the statute's plain language or contrary to public policy. Id. 16-17.
47. Id at 1. In the Scholt Opinion, supra note 9, the Board concluded:
1. Federal law exclusively governs the validity of "due-on sale" clauses in the
loan instruments of the Federal savings and loan associations.
2. "Due-on-sale" clauses are fully permissible under 12 CFR 545.6-11 (1975),
the Board regulation governing the terms of the loan documents used by Federal
associations.
3. There are valid and compelling economic and marketing considerations un-
derlying the use and exercise of "due-on-sale" clauses.
4. The "due-on-sale" clause is vital and necessary to enable savings and loan
associations to adjust their loan portfolios toward current market rates, thereby
protecting the associations' financial stability and enabling them to make new
home loans at lower interest rates than otherwise would be necessary to maintain
an adequate yield on their mortgage portfolios.
5. The "due-on-sale" clause enables savings and loan associations to sell their
existing home loans to the secondary market in an orderly manner, thereby gen-
erating new funds for additional residential loans, which otherwise would be
unavailable.
6. Elimination of the "due-on-sale" clause is likely to cause higher interest rates
on home loans generally, and a reduction of home loan funds.
7. Elimination of the "due-on-sale" clause will benefit only a limited number of
home sellers, but will cause economic hardship to the majority of home buyers
and potential home buyers. ...
Schott Opinion, supra note 9, at 38-39.
48. Id at 7-18. The Board defines the scope of its power to regulate and control
the federal associations as extending to:
... the affairs, business, business powers and authority, internal and external
expansion, supervisory matters, internal operations and affairs, relationships be-
tween the association, its management and its members, and all similar and re-
lated matters respecting Federal associations. The Board does not seek to
regulate wholly unrelated matters of purely local concern, such as zoning for
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the Board construed a regulation49 as authorizing the federal associa-
tions to use the clause to raise interest rates.5 0 Based on studies by its
economists, 51 the Board concluded that exercise of the clause for this
purpose was necessary for the federal associations' economic protec-
tion 2.5  The Board reasoned that invalidation of the clause could
threaten the economic well-being of the associations. Thus, the
clause would subvert HOLA's purpose to promote the availability of
home mortgage money through uniform regulation. 3
Some states refused to follow the advisory opinion to uphold the
federal associations' use of due-on-sale clauses to increase interest
rates, however.5 4 The Board, in light of this refusal, promulgated a
due-on-sale regulation expressly allowing use of the clause for this
purpose. 5 The regulation applied only to loans executed after July
Federal association property, methods for recording title, etc., which are left by
the Board to State and local authorities, since they do not impinge upon the
regulatory areas under Board control, or interfere with the Board's overall regu-
latory scheme.
Id at 17.
49. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(a) (1975). The provision reads as follows:
Required and authorizedprovirions. Each loan shall be evidenced by note, bond,
or other instrument... as in keeping with sound lending practices. The loan
contract shall provide for full protection to the Federal association in accordance
with applicable provisions of law, applicable governmental rules and regulations.
Id
50. Schott Opinion, supra note 9, at 15. In the Schott Advisory Opinion, the
Board interpreted this regulation's "full protection" language as authorizing the use
of the clause to raise interest rates for the federal associations' economic protection.
Id
51. Id. at 2. See id at 19-34. The economists' opinion was stated in Opinion of the
Office ofEconomic Research on the Revocation ofthe "Due on Sale Clause" in the State
of California, Exhibit I, Schott Opinion, supra note 9. After examining its econo-
mists' opinion, the Board concluded that due-on-sale clauses were necessary to pro-
tect the federal associations' financial stability and to keep mortgage rates low. Id at
21-28. It also concluded that the due-on-sale clauses necessarily enabled the federal
associations to remain competitive in the secondary mortgage market. Id See HEN-
NING, supra note 9, at 356-61 for a description of the secondary mortgage market.
52. Schott Opinion, supra note 9, at 38. See id at 21-34. For more information
on the economic protection rationales, see notes 9 and 50 supra.
53. Schott Opinion, supra note 9, at 17-19.
54. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
55. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(0 and (g), recodpffed at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 and (g),
(1981).
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31, 1976.56 In the preamble to the regulation, the Board issued a pol-
icy statement57 declaring that federal law preempted the associations'
exercise of the clause. 8
The regulation provides as follows:
(f) Due-on-sale clauses.
An association continues to have the power to include, as a matter of contract
between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument whereby the asso-
ciation may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums secured by
the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property secur-
ing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's prior
written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section with respect
to loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be
occupied by the borrower, exercise by an association of such option (hereafter
called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the
loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall
be fixed and governed by that contract.
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses.
(1) With respect to any loan made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, a Federal association: (1) shall not
exercise a due-on-sale clause because of:
(a) Creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's
security instrument;
(b) Creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(c) Transfer by devise, descent, or by operation of law upon the death of a
joint tenant;
(d) Granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an
option to purchase;
(2) Shall not impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of
the loan by exercise of a due-on-sales clause; and (3) waives its option to exercise
a due-on-sale clause as to a specific transfer if, before the transfer, the association
and the person to whom the property is to be sold or transferred (the existing
borrower's successor in interest) agree in writing that the person's credit is satis-
factory to the association and that the interest on sums secured by the association's
security interest will bepayable at a rate the association shall request. Upon such
agreement and resultant waiver the association shall release the existing bor-
rower from all obligations under the instruments, and the association is deemed
to have made a new loan to the existing borrower's successor in interest.
Id [Emphasis supplied.]
56. Id at § 545.6-11(f) recodpiedat § 545.8-3(t) (1981).
57. Board Resolution No. 76-296, 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286-87 (1976).
58. Id The preamble reads in part:
Finally, it was and is the Board's intent to have late charges and due-on-sale
practices of Federal associations governed exclusively by Federal law. There-
fore, charging of late charges and exercise of due-on-sale clauses by Federal as-
sociations shall be governed and controlled solely by section 545.6-11 and the
Board's new Statement of Policy. Federal associations shall not be bound by or
subject to any conflicting State law which imposes different late charges or due-
on-sale requirement. ...
Id
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A California district court upheld the Board's policy statement in
Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox.59 In Glendale,
a state statute required that prospective mortgagees for homes in sub-
divisions submit blank copies of their loan instruments for the Com-
missioner of Real Estate's approval.' Upon notification that the due-
on-sale clauses in its mortgage forms did not conform to California
law, Glendale Federal sought a declaratory judgment that federal
law exclusively governed the validity of the clause. 61 The court con-
strued HOLA's purpose and language62 as a congressional grant of
authority to the Board, not to the states, to select and prescribe the
best practices for supervising and regulating the federal associa-
tions.63 The court concluded that by rejecting state limitations on the
operation of due-on-sale clauses, the Board exercised precisely the
discretion delegated to it by HOLA. 4 Moreover, in examining the
language, history, purpose and structure of the Act, the court found
that, beyond express preemption of due-on-sale clauses, HOLA's
scheme preempted virtually the entire field of control over the federal
associations.65
The Glendale court expressly declined to discuss the validity of the
federal associations' due-on-sale clauses in loan contracts executed
59. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, No. 79-3573 (9th
Cir, Sept. 23, 1981) (subsequent to the district court's ruling, California's Commis-
sioner of Real Estate and Secretary of Transportation changed their policy and de-
cided to issue public reports (see note 60 infra) even when lending documents contain
due-on-sale clauses. On appeal the 9th Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on
jurisdictional grounds, petition for cert. fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1981)
(No. 81-1192)).
60. Id at 906. A California statute required that the Commissioner of Real Estate
examine any proposed subdivision and (unless grounds for denial existed), issue to
the subdivider a public report authorizing sale or lease of the lots within the subdivi-
sion. The Real Estate Department was also required to examine sample notes and
mortgages of lenders providing the loans to the ultimate homeowners in the subdivi-
sion. Glendale Federal was such a lender for a proposed development and submitted
its forms in compliance with the law. Subsequent to the required examination, Glen-
dale was told that its due-on-sale clauses did not conform to California law and that
Glendale could not serve as lender. Id at 905-06.
61. Id at 906.
62. 459 F. Supp. at 908-10.
63. Id at 910.
64. Id at 912.
65. Id. at 910.
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prior to the Board's 1976 regulation.16 Another federal court, how-
ever, subsequently ruled on the issue. In Conference of Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Associations v. Stein,67 twenty federal associations in
California sought a declaratory judgment that federal law preempted
state control over the validity of their due-on-sale clauses. 68 The
court upheld the Board's advisory opinion in the Schott case69 au-
thorizing the federal associations to use due-on-sale clauses for their
economic protection.70 The court reasoned that under the Schott ad-
visory opinion, the regulation preempted state control over the fed-
eral associations' use of due-on-sale clauses in mortgages executed
prior to, as well as after, the Board's 1976 regulation.
Notwithstanding these federal court pronouncements, some state
courts have ruled that state law controls the federal associations' ex-
ercise of the clause.72 The first state challenge to these district court
rulings was First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Englewood
v. Lockwood.73 In a foreclosure action, First Federal appealed a
lower court summary judgment that held the clause unenforceable
under state law. First Federal contended that the Board's due-on-
sale regulation preempted state law.74 The Florida appellate court
did not discuss the substantive issues of preemption. Ruling instead
on a procedural issue,75 the court implicitly assumed that federal law
did not occupy the field of due-on-sale clauses, despite the existence
of an express regulation on point.76
66. Id. at 912, construing 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) and (g), recodfled at 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8-3(f) and (g) (1981).
67. 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
68. Id at 15.
69. Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loans Ass'n, Case No. Civ-75-366 (C.D. Cal.
1975).
70. 495 F. Supp. at 17.
71. Id.
72. See Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. 3d, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (1981); De la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d
328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d
156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
73. 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
74. Id. at 157.
75. Id. at 160. It held that in the absence of enforcement procedures in the regu-
lation, a state resident would have the option of seeking relief in state court, where the
court must apply traditional equitable remedies. Id
76. Id. at 160. Rather the court concluded that:
The true issue before us is not whether a due-on-sale clause may be authorized or
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Holiday.4cres77 was the first state court to directly address the pre-
emption question after Glendale. The Minnesota Supreme Court's
approach to the preemption issue, however, was evasive. Rather than
confronting and refuting evidence favoring preemption, the court ig-
nored it or considered it superficially. Notwithstanding prior judicial
determination of congressional intent to preempt"8 and the Board's
statements of policy,79 the court viewed HOLA's scheme as permit-
ting concomitant state control over the federal association's use of
due-on-sale clauses."0 The primary theme pervading the court's ar-
gument was that mortgages and contract law are traditional areas of
state concern."' Purporting to use traditional preemption analysis, 2
the court found that neither the statute nor the Board's regulations
expressly preempted state law regarding due-on-sale clauses.8" The
court made no reference to the preamble of the Board's 1976 due-on-
sale regulation mandating preemption. 4 Rather, the court viewed
even required in a federal association mortgage instrument, but whether the due-
on-sale clause must be automatically enforced by a state court without regard to
traditional principles of equity.... We answer the question by stating that a
plaintiff who initiates a suit in equity must be subject to all the applicable conse-
quences of that action and not merely those to which he chooses to submit. This
is especially true in the instant case where applicable federal regulations exhibit a
noticeable gap in the area of enforcement.
Id
77. 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
78. See notes 59-71 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra.
80. 308 N.W.2d at 477-79.
81. See, e.g., id at 477 and 479.
82. The court used the test for preemption established in Northern States Power
Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir. 1971), aft'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972):
(1) Does the Federal government possess the power to regulate in a given area?
(2) If so, is compliance with federal law and state law a physical impossibility?
(3) If not, did Congress unequivocally and expressly declare that the authority
conferred by it should be exclusive? (4) Even if not, has Congress impliedly
preempted state control? Key factors to be considered here include the intent of
Congress, the persuasiveness of the regulatory scheme, whether the nature of the
subject matter "demands exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uni-
formity vital to national interests," whether state law would "stand as an obsta-
cle" to the realization of such national policy.
308 N.W.2d at 475. See notes 23-30 and accompanying text supra.
83. Id at 476-77.
84. Board Resolution No. 76-296, 41 Fed. Reg. 18286. See note 58 supra for the
language of the preamble.
Subsequent to Holiday Acres, the Board issued a new, stronger policy statement,
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f) (1981) "in order to allay the uncertainty expressed by
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the regulation's language that "all rights and remedies of the associa-
tion and the borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract ' 85
as requiring state property and contract law to govern the rights of
parties to mortgages.8 6 With respect to preemption prior to 1976, the
court narrowly construed the regulation providing "full protection to
the association, ' 87 limiting it only to the factors listed in the regula-
tion.8 8 The court neither considered the Board's advisory opinion in
Schott 89 nor discussed the Conference ruling90 on due-on-sale
clauses. 91
The court's analysis of implied preemption was also less than en-
lightening. The court distinguished Glendale92 by noting that, in the
instant case, Minnesota law required no approval of forms nor did it
regulate other internal matters of the federal associations.93 The Rol-
iday 4cres court failed to confront the contention that mortgage con-
tracts were internal matters and thereby federally preempted. 94
Instead, the court heldper se that mortgage contracts were not inter-
a few state courts regarding this matter." Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. Resolution
No. 81-409, July 23, 1981. The new statement reads in part:
(1) Paragraph (f) of § 545.8-3 confirms the continuing authority of Federal as-
sociations to include due-on-sale clauses in their mortgage loan contracts and to
exercise such clauses, subject only to the express limitations contained in § 545.8-
3(g). Due-on-sale practices of Federal associations shall be governed exclusively
by the Board's regulations, in preemption of and without regard to any limita-
tions imposed by state law on either their inclusion or exercise (including, but not
confined to, state law prohibitions against restraints on alienation, prohibitions
against penalties and forfeitures, equitable restrictions and state law dealing with
equitable transfers).
12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f)(2) (1981).
85. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11() (1975) recodfed at 12 C.F.R. § 454.8-3(f) (1981).
86. 308 N.W.2d at 477.
87. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1975). See notes 49-50 supra.
88. 308 N.W.2d at 477.
89. Schott Opinion, supra note 9.
90. 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979). See notes 67-71 and accompanying text
supra.
91. The court instead considered the wrong Conference case: it distinguished a
companion case, Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns. v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9thCir. 1979), aj'dmem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980), which involved a California anti-redlining
statute. See 308 N.W.2d at 478.
92. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See notes 59-65 and accompanying text
supra.
93. 308 N.W.2d at 479.
94. The Holiday Acres court distinguished Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
of Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 270 N.W.2d 367 (1974) on an inapposite technicality.
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nal matters.95
Ignoring the preventative aspects of the statutory scheme, the court
construed HOLA's purpose narrowly, suggesting that Congress
passed HOLA only to remedy the Depression conditions.96  The
court, addressing the need for national uniformity, noted that the
Board's 1976 regulation merely granted permission to include the
clause.97 The court reasoned that if national uniformity were an im-
portant policy, the regulation would require a federal association to
include a clause declaring such in the loan contract.98 In addition,
the court saw no inconsistency between the 1976 regulation9 9 and
state control: federal permission to include the clause "does not nec-
308 N.W.2d at 480 n.9. 72 Wis. 2d 132, 136, 240 N.W.2d 367, 370 (1976). (For more
detailed discussion on Kaski, see note 43 supra).
The HolidayAcres court noted that, in the context of exemption from state sales tax
and use taxes, the Minnesota Supreme Court had previously held that federal savings
and loan associations were not instrumentalities of the United States. 308 N.W.2d at
480 n.9. The court did not mention the fact that HOLA expressly grants to the states
the right to levy state taxes on federal savings and loan associations. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(h) (1976).
The Holiday Acres court suggested that Kaski's holding of federal preemption was
based on the Kaski court's assumption that federal savings and loan associations are
"instrumentalities of the United States." The Kaski court actually stated:
The fact that a federal savings and loan association, such as defendant in the
instant case, is chartered under a comprehensive federal law and is, by law, an
instrumentality of the United States raises the question of whether the law appli-
cable to it in respects not specifically acknowledged to be within the authority of
the states is preempted by the comprehensive statutory scheme enacted by Con-
gress and by the rules of the Home Loan Bank Board pursuant to the United
States Code.
95. 308 N.W.2d at 478.
96. Id at 479. See note 35 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of
HOLA's history and purpose.
97. Id
98. Id The Board's new policy statement speaks specifically to this issue of grant-
ing permission to include the clause.
.. [The Board has determined that the due-on-sale clause normally is a valua-
ble and often an indispensable source of protection for the financial soundness of
Federal associations and for their continued ability to fund new home loan com-
mitments. Consequently, the Board for many years has authorized due-on-sale
clauses for use by Federal associations. However, because the Board desires to
afford associations the flexibility to accommodate special situations and circum-
stances, § 545.8-3(f) of this Subchapter by its terms merely authorizes rather than
compels the inclusion and exercise of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage loans.
12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f)(1) (1981).
99. See 12 C.F.R. § 454.68-3(f), (g) (1980).
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essarily preclude state prohibition."' "°°
The Holiday Acres court's failure to present cogent arguments
against the evidence favoring preemption" 1 may have hastened the
result it sought to avoid. As this comment went to press, the Supreme
Court decided Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. De le
Cuesta,'02 holding that the Board's due-on-sale regulation 03
preempts conflicting state restrictions on the due-on-sale practices of
federal savings and loans associations. 104
In Fidelity Federal, the Court considered the validity of a Califor-
nia rule limiting the exercise of due-on-sale provisions to situations
where the lender demonstrated that the transfer of the property im-
paired its security.10 s The Court first found that the Board, in
promulgating the regulation, clearly intended to preempt conflicting
state laws.10 6 Appellees argued that the regulation did not totally dis-
place state law,'0 7 asserting that the language of the regulation' 0 8 per-
mitted incorporating state contract law. The Court rejected the
100. 308 N.W.2d at 479.
101. The Holiday Acres court's analysis is not indefensible. For example, the
court's analysis implied a federalism argument but did not explore it. It is certainly
arguable that state citizens have the right under the Constitution to decide (through
their elected representatives in the state legislature) whether lenders or homeowners
should bear the cost of inflationary interest rates. See note 9 supra. As a complex
eocnomic question requiring the balancing of the interests of each group, a legislative
body rather than an administrative one (such as the Board) might better decide the
issue. One court has in fact touched upon this argument. See De le Cuesta v. Fidelity
Federal Say. & Loans Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), rep"d, 50
U.S.L.W. 4916 (June 28, 1982) (No. 81-750).
102. 50 U.S.L.W. 4916 (June 28, 1982) (No. 81-750).
103. See 12 CFR § 545.8-3(f) (1982).
104. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4923-24.
105. Id. at 4918. The rule in question was announced by the California Supreme
Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978). The California Court of Appeals relied upon Wellenkamp to hold
that the lender could not enforce a due-on-sale provision in a loan contract specifying
appellees' property which they had purchased from the original borrower, as security.
Id. at 4918. See 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981).
106. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4919-20.
107. Id. at 4920.
108. The language relied upon by the appellees provided:
[E]xercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale
clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all
rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed
by that contract.
Id. at 4920, quoting CFR § 545.8-3(f) (1982).
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argument, ruling that the language in question merely limited the
scope of the regulation to the terms of the loan contract."°9
In the second part of its analysis, the Court found that the Board
had acted within the authority delegated to it by Congress.I" Justice
Blackmun ruled that Congress, in enacting HOLA, granted the Board
plenary power to regulate the operations of federal savings and
loans.'" The Court read these powers broadly,'1 2 noting that "Con-
gress plainly envisioned that federal savings and loans would be gov-
erned by what the Board-not any particular State-deemed to be
the 'best practices.' "113 In light of the Board's broad regulatory au-
thority under HOLA, the Court deferred to its justification for the
due-on-sale 1 4 provision despite countervailing arguments.'15
Alice L. Cushman
109. The Court ruled that
[Tihe second sentence of 545.8-3(0 simply makes clear that the regulation does
not empower federal savings and loans to accelerate a loan upon transfer of the
security property unless the parties to the particular loan instrument, as a matter
of contract, have given the lender that right. Similarly, if the parties to a given
contract agree somehow to limit the association's right to exercise a due-on-sale
provision, the second sentene ... precludes the lender from relying on the first
sentence as authorizing more expansive use of the clause.
Id. at 4920.
110. Id.at4921.
IlI. Id.
112. Id. The Court found that
The broad language of § 5(a) [of HOLA] expresses no limits on the Board's au-
thority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans. As one
court put it, '[iut would have been difficult for Congress to give the Bank Board a
broader mandate.' [Citing Glendale Federal Sav. & Loans Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F.
Supp. 903, 910 (C.D. Cal. 1978), supplemented, 481 F. Supp. 616 (1979), rev'd and
remandedon othergroundr, 636 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-
1192.] And Congress' explicit delegation of jurisdiction over the 'operation' of
these institutions must empower the Board to issue regulations governing mort-
gage loan instruments, for mortgages are a central part of any savings and loan's
'operation.'
Id.
113. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4921.
114. Id. at 4923.
115. Id. at 4923 n.22.
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